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The Formation of Terrorist Groups: An Analysis of Irish Republican Organizations  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the history of the organization of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and 
assess whether Republican terrorism reflected the possession of valuable group-specific 
human capital within the terrorist cell.  The analysis is motivated by economic models of 
the formation of specialized groups. We also note the public-goods coordination problem 
facing terrorist groups, given their inability to use mainstream enforcement mechanisms.  
Of particular interest are four well-defined historical examples of factionalism within the 
IRA. The history of Irish republicanism is consistent with the prediction that increasing 
the opportunities for cell members outside of life in the organization, particularly through 
amnesty, destabilizes the organization but leaves a hardcore of remaining terrorists. The 
gap between terrorist characteristics and those belonging to members of wider society is 
more gradated than predicted.  
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1. Introduction 
 
We build an historical analysis of organizational splits within the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) on the tradition of recent papers identifying both rationality and organizational 
constraints as important elements explaining terrorist activities (Pittel and Rűbbelke, 
2011; Shughart, 2011; Santiford-Jordan and Sandler, 2014; Phillips and Pohl, 2014). We 
argue that the terrorist cell is a type of dysfunctional group, or gang, using violent acts to 
force transfers of political resources, and that it can be understood largely in terms of the 
benefits of marshalling the human capital embodied in it (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010; Allen 
and Reed, 2006) and of coordinating loyal behavior (Leeson, 2009; Skarbek, 2012 and 
2014). Terrorists are rational in two senses. First, they face a budget constraint so they are 
confronted by the issue of making best use of resources; second, rational responses to 
counterterrorist policies will aid groups in securing their political goals (Shughart, 2011). 
Our view of rationality is similar to that of Tullock (1974) and regards human behavior as 
purposeful and consistent over time.  This view of rationality does not rule out terrorists 
having both intrinsic and extrinsic motives, where the former can reflect the 
representation of a segment of the population such as republicans resident in Northern 
Ireland or elsewhere (Frey, 1997; Benabou and Tirole, 2003). Intrinsic motivation is a 
simpler way to recognize extra-personal motives, or moral sentiments (Smith, 1976), than 
introducing pure altruism into our analysis, which would raise major difficulties for our 
view of rationality (Collard, 1978).  
 As Schelling suggested and more recent research supports, organizational issues – 
such as fund raising and the need for leaders to manage a group well - arise naturally in 
the setting of terrorist groups (Schelling, 1991; Pittel and Rűbbelke, 2011). When 
terrorists behave rationally and predictably, it is possible for counterterrorist operations to 
meet terrorists’ anticipated behavior (Abrahms, 2004). Furthermore, counterterrorism can 
lead to terrorist groups splintering, as predicted by Dnes and Garoupa (2010), and such 
splits in the IRA provide a natural experiment giving clues to the nature of terrorist 
organization and cell formation of wider interest. Coordination of loyalty within illegal 
groups is difficult as noted recently by Skarbek (2014) for the comparable problem 
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affecting prison gangs, which, like terrorists, cannot enforce agreements by drawing on 
the institutions of mainstream society.  
In this paper we examine the characteristics and associated behavior of individuals in 
a terrorist group, or ‘cell,’ which is a special case of a dysfunctional, or ‘rogue,’ social 
group. Comparable dysfunctional groups exist in street gangs, prison gangs, organized 
crime and rogue businesses (Gilbert, 2006; Venkatesh, 2008; Garoupa, Klick and Parisi, 
2009; Dnes and Garoupa, 2010; Dnes, 2013; Skarbek 2014).   Individuals in a terrorist 
setting have negative value for the rest of society, impeding mainstream social and 
business activities, and exhibit considerable risk-taking for the narrow benefit of the 
group (Becker and Rubenstein, 2011). Such a group must govern members (Skarbek, 
2012 and 2014) to mitigate incentives for individuals to betray group interests.  In the 
case of the IRA, betrayal has typically been associated with amnesties. Maintaining group 
solidarity has a public good element to it comparable to that affecting small polities 
Olson (1965).  We do examine betrayal issues, although our principal focus is on the 
peculiar human capital requirements underlying rogue groups.  Human capital 
requirements for terrorists are distinctive, whereas the public-good problem of 
coordinating group solidarity is common to all groups.  The distinctive human capital in 
a group explains its distance from mainstream society and the scope, if any, for drawing 
it into the mainstream. This emphasis does not mean we are dismissive of the problem of 
coordinating the rogue group.  Indeed, our analysis is consistent with the idea that high 
group solidarity, possibly based on ethnic factors, may well lead to greater longevity for 
the terrorist group (Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler, 2011).  We focus on several well 
documented case studies of evolved terrorism, drawing on four historical examples of 
factionalism, or ‘splits’ within the IRA. The history enables some testing, or at least an 
exploration, of the predictions of a model emphasizing the value of specialized human 
capital within rogue groups (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010).  The IRA is chosen as a basis for 
the empirical study because of the well documented nature of its organizational changes.   
 Dnes and Garoupa (2010) used the example of a street gang to show that behavior in 
rogue groups can reflect rational influences more so than is commonly understood. Even 
apparently irrational behavior, such as publicly facing down much stronger gangs, may 
be indirectly rational in preserving reputational human capital. Much terrorist activity can 
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be shown to signal possession of skills of value to the rogue group, indicating a need to 
take a sophisticated view of deterrence principles in dealing with terrorism. Dnes and 
Garoupa (2010) draw on Allen and Reed’s (2006) analysis of dueling as a screening 
device used to ascertain human capital in the shape of honor characteristics useful in a 
monarchic retinue, although for rogue groups the information flow appears to involve 
signaling (at the terrorist’s effort cost) rather than screening by a principal.  The terrorist 
cell is a particularly striking example of misplaced team spirit underlining the observation 
that not all cooperative behavior is welfare enhancing from a social perspective. Papers 
by Frey and Luechinger (2003), Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007), and Phillips and 
Pohl (2014) also may be seen as raising questions about the applicability of standard 
deterrence analysis (Becker, 1968; Landes, 1976) in the case of terrorists, but drawing on 
observations about consequences of partial intrinsic motivation. Dnes and Garoupa 
(2010) emphasize the separation of dysfunctional groups from mainstream society and 
the influence of individuals’ betrayal of the group on the impact of amnesty (leniency) 
policies, giving a good basis for the examination of factional splits. The betrayal 
possibility has a public good element for the group, but the more interesting aspect is how 
those terrorists with human capital closer to the endowments in mainstream society are 
more easily picked off by an amnesty, which leaves truly bad elements in place. 
Further papers are also supportive of the view that the human capital in dysfunctional 
groups is highly distinctive.  Limits to group formation arise through a comparison 
between outside and within-group opportunities, but this interaction is not 
straightforward. In particular, increasing outside opportunities for members may tempt 
disloyalty, the prospect of which can make the leader much more selective in admitting 
members and is likely to cause an increase in the perceived hardcore nastiness of terror 
groups. Reckless violence is a key characteristic observed for street gangs, as supported 
by empirical work on recklessness among violent individuals (Foreman-Peck and Moore, 
2010).  Reading the history of Republican terrorism (below), similar characteristics 
appear to be important for terrorist groups, which emphasize idiosyncratic skills very 
dangerous to the rest of society.  The prediction of an amnesty leading to a residual of 
hardcore members is supported by observations on the history of the IRA, which has 
been markedly affected by ‘splits’ into more fragmented terrorist organizations as anti-
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terrorist policies and outside opportunities have varied.   The lessons drawn in this paper 
from well documented UK and Irish history may also help in understanding other 
terrorist developments such as the transition from al-Qaeda to ISIL in Syria and Iraq.  
Splits within terrorist groups and associated increases in the severity of subsequent 
terrorism are widely observed and are a key prediction of the human-capital theory of 
gangs (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010).  Economic analysis suggests it may be an unrealistic 
expectation that policy can ever completely control terrorist activity, which is consistent 
with the historical evidence.   
 
2. Behavior in Terrorist Cells 
In this section we consider some key points drawn from the theoretical literature but do 
not repeat theoretical analysis in detail. 
 As noted by Frey and Luechinger (2007), terrorism is often undertaken to achieve 
an indirect goal, which is usually political and can be at least partly associated with 
intrinsic motivation for the terrorist.  It can be successful as a strategy, as can be observed 
in the case of the peace process in Northern Ireland, where power sharing has given seats 
in government to Sinn Féin that could not be won in regular elections.  Terrorism and its 
close relative guerrilla warfare are often the weapons of minorities who feel excluded 
from regular power mechanisms in conventional politics.  History is replete with 
terrorists who succeeded in their aims of driving off opponents and then became 
mainstream politicians, including Nelson Mandela (South Africa), Robert Mugabe 
(Rhodesia), Menachem Begin (Israel), and Martin McGuinness (Northern Ireland). 
Throughout history, terrorism has in fact often paid off for its participants.  
 Therefore, in just the way that street gangs pursue a mixture of collective and 
individual benefits (Dnes and Garoupa (2010: 523), so terrorist groups can be viewed as 
engaged in a team effort to achieve gains some of which at least could be shared between 
members of the group, not necessarily equally.  But note that an implication of 
responsiveness to achievable gains is the possibility of an individual terrorist betraying 
the group.  Indeed, betrayal can be observed in the diffusing since 9/11 of plots to place 
explosives on airplanes, with information frequently coming from defecting terrorists via 
international intelligence services.  Another, related, implication of incentive 
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responsiveness is that group members who possess human capital closer to that useful in 
mainstream society may try to rejoin mainstream society as relative costs and benefits 
change for the two types of membership.  It is the comparison between outside 
opportunities and benefits from committing human capital to furthering the aims of the 
group that drives the possibility of a terrorist group’s splitting.  The leadership of the 
group may be expected to do everything possible to prevent a split, carrying out reprisals 
against informers and beneficiaries of amnesties, in much the manner described by 
Skarbek (2014) in his observations on prison gangs.   
Terrorists also engage in the type of signaling activity commonly observed in 
street gangs, other dysfunctional groups, and even the signaling observed in many 
functional groups. Consider, for example, carrying out reckless missions showing 
personal cost in placing group interests ahead of direct private interests. Such acts can be 
found with dysfunctional social effect in street gangs, and with benefits to mainstream 
society in acts of military heroism.  For the most part ‘terrorist ways’ are capable of 
relatively straightforward interpretation, either in terms of static decision making (Frey 
and Leuchinger 2003), or in terms of strategic interaction (Dnes and Garoupa 2010: 522).  
The exception may be the case of the suicide bomber, but, even then, we can discern a 
payoff function (Santifort-Jordan and Sandler, 2014) in terms of endogenously developed 
preferences within a cell, or consequences for the individual or his family that would 
follow failure to carry out the suicidal act. To emphasize the point that the same type of 
behavior may be viewed as good or bad by mainstream society, note how members of 
legitimate, functional groups, such as the WWII Polish RAF pilots who rammed German 
planes after running out of bullets, also sometimes behave in ways that could be regarded 
as reckless, irrational and suicidal.  We could possibly regard mainstream society simply 
as the larger gang, with the issue being understanding smaller groups remaining outside 
of mainstream society. 
 Although observations of terrorist behavior continue to raise puzzles, some 
behavior can be understood better once we realize that its rational purpose may not be 
immediately obvious.  Groups of various types are a pervasive phenomenon in which 
localized objectives dominate relative to those of the wider society, and become 
dysfunctional when a negative externality flows to the more general population. Problems 
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arise particularly with groups that threaten mainstream society, which is especially the 
case with terrorist cells.  Note too that the difficult case of the suicide bomber, in the case 
where intrinsic motivation is not the motivator, is consistent with a public-good analysis 
of discipline within the terrorist group: measures may be taken by the leadership of the 
cell to force an individual to behave in this irrational way with the result that other 
members of the group become more disciplined.  Thus, the leadership could use threats 
against an individual’s family to elicit suicidal bombing from the individual, and the 
threat of being forced to suicide bomb to control other individuals in the group.  Echoes 
of this approach arise in Skarbek’s (2014) observations of prison gangs.   
Another puzzle to be resolved is why terrorist groups split. A number of economics-
based explanations have been provided for factionalism within terrorist organizations. 
These papers tend to suggest that counterterrorist response is an important determinant of 
the balance between moderate and more extreme elements within a given terrorist group. 
In papers by de Figueirdo and Weingast (2001) and Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) 
terrorists can be either moderate or radical. In these papers moderates always become 
radicalized by government crackdowns. However, while these authors can explain why a 
given grouping can become more extreme, such an approach cannot easily explain why 
terrorist groups often split into factions. Historically, moderates have not always gone 
along with the extremist turn in a cell.  Dnes and Garoupa (2010) explain this distinction 
in terms of an increase in the level of group-related human capital required for admission 
into the gang following an increase in the gang leader’s anxiety concerning loyalty.  Such 
a loyalty effect may be a good fit in explaining the responsive toughening of terror cells 
following an authority’s stepping up of counterterrorist policies, especially concerning 
leniency programs aimed at tempting out members.  A leader might well prefer to rely on 
those members with very high levels of commitment, possibly just those with an 
appalling record making them unlikely recipients of amnesty. Also, crackdowns do 
sometimes work: notably in suppressing the IRA on both sides of the border during and 
immediately after WWII. 
Research raising the possibility of an entire terrorist grouping moving toward greater 
extremism following a crackdown (de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007) may well pick up on 
special cases, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang in which an extremist faction hoped that 
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by inducing heavy-handed policing they could radicalize a population.  But more 
generally, as the IRA history shows, we have seen extreme vanguards emerge following 
policies drawing moderates back toward mainstream society.  The situation is somewhat 
different when an authority has suppressed a wider population in an effort to deter 
terrorist violence, which can have the effect of increasing resistance to the dominant 
policing authority (English, 2003; de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007).  Nonetheless, some 
of the observed increased extremism may reflect intensification of efforts to retain public-
good aspects of discipline within the remaining group.  
 
3. Key Predictions from a Model of Group Human Capital  
Dnes and Garoupa (2010: 524) demonstrated formally that rational influences can 
determine norms of behavior within groups, where even apparently irrational behavior 
can be explained as of indirect benefit to the individual member of a group.  The model 
makes several key predictions that can be applied to terrorist cells.  We state these very 
briefly here and in plain terms following the Marshallian practice of avoiding 
unnecessary technical analysis.  The formal analysis in Allen and Reed (2006) may also 
be consulted for insight into the interplay between specialized skills, group formation and 
screening.   
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the history of the IRA in relation to 
insights from the model, but for a moment we need to consider groups more generally. 
Dnes and Garoupa (2010) contemplate a population with varying ex-ante endowments of 
a particular type of human capital, which can be augmented by costly investment in the 
case of individuals sufficiently close to a reservation level set by a leader and allowing 
entry into the group.  The selection of the leader is of no particular importance and we 
can just say that the leader emerges either by some kind of tournament, or as the 
possessor of the highest level of the relevant human capital, which in his case may 
include the ability to provide discipline of the group, which has public good elements for 
the individuals in the group (Olson, 1965; Skarbek, 2014).  Individuals then decide 
whether to try to join the group or stay in mainstream society (a kind of greater gang 
really) and are allowed to invest in the required skills to join the group.  Investment for 
terrorists might include such historical examples as training for weeks in a Libyan camp, 
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actually in much the same way that joining the commandos in the military requires 
investments in boot camp. This way of thinking implies that a significant ex-post skills 
gap will emerge between those within and outside the group, much as a skills gap 
emerges in Allen and Reed’s (2006) treatment of dueling and associated codes of honor.  
The reason is that if some individuals are close in terms of human capital (skills) to the 
cut-off point set by a group leader they might well find it worth investing in enhancing 
their skills to move into the group.  Thus, in much the same way that trained economists 
separate themselves from the rest of the population, a terrorist cell can be expected to 
contain people who are distinct from the surrounding population.  Ex post, no-one would 
be in the skill range sR – s* for the general population, where s* is the minimum ex ante 
level at which it pays to invest to be brought up to sR  the level required for group entry. 
Dnes and Garoupa (2010) assume the leader benefits from a residual claim after 
rewarding group members unevenly according to their contribution to the output of the 
group, which may also be seen as embodying a reward for providing the public good of 
establishing group solidarity (Olson, 1965; Skarbek, 2014).  Note that holding discipline 
in the face of individual temptation to defect has public-good aspects for the group 
(Tullock, 1974) and is not simply a matter of deterring shirking in team production 
(compare Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).   In the case of a terrorist cell, total gains include 
those from eventual success in attaining political benefits, associated organized criminal 
activity, and other interactions with the outside world.  Each member takes a share of the 
average gain that leaves a surplus available for payment to the leader. But for any 
individual, the expected gain from membership comprises the gain as a member plus the 
expected gain from betrayal.  The probability of the individual betraying the group 
depends among other factors on the utility from betrayal, and will reflect such things as 
the introduction of a leniency program, amnesties, and increases in outside opportunities 
associated with leaving the group. Thus, groups are prone to desertion as incentives 
outside the group change and leaders have to deal with that threat.  One way to think of 
this is to realize that the leader would otherwise want the group to grow without limit 
since extra foot soldiers will bring in more returns from which the leader will extract a 
residual.  Some downside, such as increased organizational costs, or as here disloyalty 
costs, is needed to give an upper bound to the size of the group.  Growth of the 
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organizational unit inevitably makes the cost of providing public goods like group 
solidarity higher (Olson, 1965) because it becomes harder to monitor and influence foot 
soldiers. 
Group leaders will suffer from problems of information asymmetry as they have 
no ability to discern levels of group-relevant human capital, ex ante.  They can ascertain 
whether individuals have sufficient natural-born, or acquired group-relevant human 
capital by screening for or observing the signaling of terrorist acts.  The danger of 
betrayal is also a motivating factor for expecting regular signaling of the commitment of 
cell members, which may well explain the frequency of minor as well as extreme acts of 
terrorism observed across the history of terrorist organizations.  In the case of the IRA, 
we can see regular, relatively small acts of terror, such as individual ‘punishment 
beatings’, as well as major acts such as the bombing of densely populated locations 
resulting in many deaths and injuries. One purpose of the smaller acts may well be to 
permit signaling of commitment by foot soldiers, as well as directly deterring the 
disloyalty to which the beating was a response. A useful comparator is the observation by 
students of street gangs of acts of extreme recklessness the purpose of which appears to 
be to impress other gang members (Gilbert, 2006), and on the deterrence side Skarbek’s 
(2014) observations of discipline within prison gangs. It is notable that the IRA organized 
its own internal security, colloquially known as the nutting squad. The role of this group 
was to interrogate, court-martial and execute suspected informants or spies. This group 
also organized the punishment squads, a lower tier of initially less skilled volunteers, who 
were not members of the Active Service Units (ASUs) although crucially they could 
secure promotion to ASU membership if they displayed the appropriate abilities 
(O’Leary, 2007, p.204). 
An increase in the probability of betrayal may reflect the growth of outside 
opportunities for members, and can reflect leniency programs.  The increase has three 
important effects: 
1.  s*, the minimum ex ante level of group-relevant human capital at which it 
pays to invest to be brought up to sR, the level required for group entry 
decreases as more individuals are willing to invest in group human capital 
because outside opportunities after membership have increased; 
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2. The residual payment to the leader decreases as the leader is worse-off since 
the probability of betrayal has increased; 
3. The leader will increase sR making group human capital requirements to offset 
the higher likelihood of betrayal.  
The first and third effects taken together generate the ambiguous result that a 
change in the probability of betrayal might increase or decrease the size of the terrorist 
cell.  The result nonetheless warn us that we can inadvertently make a period of time 
spent as a terrorist more attractive, i.e. less temporarily worrying to would-be members, 
by increasing the value of outside activities that can be pursued after retirement from 
active terrorism. This possibility might cause members to betray with increased 
frequency.  However, increasing the level of group human capital, sR, has one completely 
unambiguous result: the cell will be smaller, but nastier from the point of view of the 
population at large.  
Several important conclusions follow.  First, there should be marked differences 
between the characteristics of the population at large and terrorist cells: it may be 
possible to profile terrorists by previous history, including membership of related 
organizations such as the political wings of broader terrorist movements.  Secondly, we 
should find regular signaling of commitment within terrorist organizations, consistent 
with the investment and signaling mechanisms just described.  Thirdly, terrorist 
amnesties and leniency programs could have the counterproductive effect of encouraging 
the formation of terrorist cells, but may not, since another possibility is reforming 
terrorists.  Finally, when amnesties or increases in the costs of being a terrorist do reduce 
formation of cells, a hard-core residual is likely to remain.  Nothing in this analysis 
precludes tough deterrence using conventional criminal-justice mechanisms from 
controlling terrorism, but an implication is that we may make it difficult for terrorists to 
give up and rejoin mainstream society. We now turn to an historical examination of the 
development of the IRA, which provides an institutional assessment of this reasoning 
based on group-relevant human capital.  
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4. Four historical examples of splits within the Irish Republican Army. 
 
The [Provisional] IRA … made political decisions on the basis of what…it felt it could prosecute, 
not on what it felt its community was absorbing. Because the IRA is a very stubborn organization … 
It would go against public opinion, … if it thought that there was an achievable objective (Danny 
Morrison quoted in English, 2003: 285). 
 
…it may be that Irish Republican terrorism [barely] kept alive … a political movement that 
after decades of futility reached something like critical mass and became a genuine political 
force, the ultimate outcome still unknown…(Schelling, 1991: 23).  
 
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been a proscribed terrorist organization in both the 
United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland for almost 100 years.   The history of the IRA 
provides tests of theoretical predictions derived above.  In particular, we can observe 
profile differences between IRA officers and men and the population at large, and the 
impact of varying outside incentives on the nature and strength of the IRA.  Varying 
outside incentives tend to show up more as splits within the organization, or as amnesties 
for incarcerated terrorist prisoners, but a close connection exists between an 
organization’s splitting and some of its members betraying others, and releasing prisoners 
can affect the incentives of possible recruits. Profile differences turn out to be more 
complex than predicted by the model, but consistent with its underlying focus. We also 
can observe a frequency of terrorist activity consistent with the relentless signaling of 
terror capacity.  
An overview of the main details of the relevant history can be stated briefly, 
focusing on the long-tradition of splits within Irish republican terrorist groups. In the 
1930s, almost a decade after the achievement of Irish independence from the United 
Kingdom, a pattern was established of a left-leaning IRA leadership getting severely out 
of step from the wider population, including its own ‘grassroots’ foot soldiers. This 
division created tensions within the organization and led to departures resulting in a 
hardcore residual dominating the paramilitary and starting a bombing campaign in 
England. After the Second World War, the IRA border campaign of 1956-62 was a total 
failure, but subsequent amnesties for political prisoners north and south of the Irish 
border may have encouraged later violence. 
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 The experience of the 1930s was repeated in the 1960s, and reignited tension 
(along with the ramifications of the border campaign) setting up the eventual 1969/70 
split in the IRA between the Officials and the Provisionals, of which the latter were 
slower to adopt exclusively peaceful means. The Provisional IRA’s later shift away from 
violence and toward acceptance of Sinn Féin’s political support for electoral politics 
created another round of splits between those republicans favoring the continuation of 
armed struggle and those who benefited from embracing politics. Deterrence policies 
(notably internment, which incapacitates terrorists) were successful in most periods in 
combating the IRA. The counter-productive record of internment during the 1970s was 
linked to a specific failure of security intelligence.  We end our historical examples just 
prior to 2010 because more recent events, which continue to show residual violence and 
splits (Independent International Monitoring Commission, 2010: 5) are not yet well 
analyzed in an academic setting.  
We now examine the history in more detail, beginning with the history of splits.  
The existence of dissident groupings within Irish republicanism is a far from new 
phenomenon. Moreover, a recurrent cycle or pattern of splits between hardliners and 
moderates exists within modern Irish republican paramilitaries (defined here as illegal 
armed groups seeking to reverse the formal constitutional partition of Ireland established 
in the 1920s). The cycle of splits is matched by events in terror campaigns that serve to 
demonstrate the capacity of hardliners for violence.  
Throughout the period since the 1920s, there has been tension between those 
republicans who have sought to pursue their agenda by both electoral and paramilitary 
means and those who have sought to use military means. When the tension culminates in 
an organizational split, the previously dissident faction tends to be the more violent. As 
we will see also splits often beget further splits. Later dissident groups, the Real IRA and 
the Continuity IRA, are merely a recent manifestation of this tendency for these groups to 
split for tactical reasons such as disagreement over the means to be used to achieve Irish 
unity. Splits in themselves represent betrayal within an organization, reflecting more 
attractive outside opportunities, and may well alter the chances of betrayal in relation to 
the security authorities. 
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However, one important historical change should be noted.  Before the end of the 
Cold War in the 1980s there was a strong Marxist influence within republican 
paramilitary groups. English describes this tradition as a ‘significant secondary goal of 
the organization’ and he observes that as late as the 1980s it was for example the 
‘dominant ideology’ among republican prisoners in the H-Blocks (English, 2016: 109). 
This ideological element, which fermented a disagreement over the form that Irish unity 
should take, complicates a purely tactical explanation for some of the splits (e.g. the 
creation of Republican Congress in the 1930s, or the emergence of the Irish National 
Liberation Army/Irish Republican Socialist Party in the 1970s, had a strong ideological 
component). Therefore, prior to the 1980s these splits had both tactical and ideological 
elements that were consistent with the view of groups as particular combinations of 
human capital. Many of the splits have been encouraged by infiltration by the security 
forces and the use of informers and intelligence, as well as changing outside opportunities 
– enhancing betrayal incentives in the manner discussed by Dnes and Garoupa (2010: 
525).   
The current dissidents have split as a result of republicanism’s moving away from 
the Provisional IRA’s guerilla militarism toward Sinn Féin’s political engagement in 
representative democracy. We now examine the tensions in the 1920s and 1930s, 
followed by the split associated with the failure of the border campaign, then the 
emergence of the Provisional IRA in 1969/70 and finally the emergence and activities of 
the current three dissident groups. The four historical examples are chosen for their 
documentation and richness of detail and are inclusive rather than comprehensive: they 
represent periods when changes in IRA activity were particularly noticeable. 
  
Splits and radicalism in the IRA after Irish independence 
The IRA of the 1920s to the late 1930s is often presented as containing distinct groups in 
which hawks and doves coexisted uneasily. The composition of those forming the IRA 
changed as splits empowered militants:  
The … republican experience from the 1920s to the late 1930s…reflected the 
gradual paring away of all the layers of political influence, as … elements which 
sought to challenge the movement’s [violent] ideological parameters … eventually 
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felt compelled to dissociate themselves from the movement…Each successive 
defection enhanced the deference to republican orthodoxy of those who remained 
…. The … 1939 bombing campaign can be seen … as a sign of the movement 
reverting to type, as a vehicle for preserving the doctrinal purity of the republican 
vision. The bombing campaign underscored … a ‘militarist caste’ ….  (Smith, 1997: 
65-66). 
The embrace of Marxist ideology by the IRA leadership and disillusionment with 
the republican rhetoric of the Irish leader, de Valera, at a time when the Irish Free State 
had emerged (via Dominion status like present-day Canada), ensured that many IRA 
members gave up involvement in politics (Smith, 1997: 62: English, 2003: 49). Many 
socialist intellectuals left to fight in the Spanish civil war, while others defected to form 
the ‘short-lived, fissiparous Republican Congress’ (English, 2003: 49). 
The net result was that a hardcore residual group remained. This hardcore residual 
was crucially far more committed to violence than those who had left the organization. 
Sean Russell, a member of this militant faction, was elected IRA Chief of Staff at the 
IRA Convention of 1938. Russell advocated an IRA bombing campaign against England. 
It is noteworthy that Russell’s election as leader led to the further defection of several 
relatively less militaristic figures such as Seán MacBride and Tom Barry (Smith, 1997: 
62-63).  
By the end of 1939 there had been 291 bombs exploded in Britain. These attacks 
resulted in 96 injuries and seven deaths. A tough security response followed: in Eire 
(Ireland), a Special Branch raid in September 1939 led to the arrest of virtually the entire 
IRA General Headquarters (GHQ) (Bell, 1990: 168). In Northern Ireland, IRA members 
were interned for the duration of the War, and the tight security response broke the 
organization apart. The bulk of the membership was jailed in the UK and Eire, or had 
been shot down, and, as late as 1950, twelve IRA members were still imprisoned in 
Belfast’s Crumlin Road prison. By 1945 the IRA had “apparently died, defeated, another 
romantic cord in the pattern of Irish history frayed and broken” (Bell, 1990: 235).  
Neither the British at war, nor the ostensibly neutral Irish, wanted to risk 
misunderstandings over nationalist conflict during WWII: both therefore cracked down 
hard.  Moreover, as the following section shows, the IRA was revived briefly within a 
decade, but it would face similar internal tensions as it did in the 1930s and 1940s. 
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Ruthless responses to terrorism in the late 1930s and early 1940s seemingly broke the 
IRA for a time, perhaps under special circumstances, and not dependent on amnesties or 
similar leniency programs. The period supports an interpretation a narrowly drawn 
application of deterrence principles, with a measure of incapacitation of combatants 
thrown in for good measure.  Nonetheless, before the run up to WWII, it is clear that a 
post-independence division emerged between moderate and more extreme republicans, 
with the later remaining as a militaristic hardcore in a much reduced IRA.  
 
The IRA border campaign 1956-1962    
The planning for this campaign began in 1950, but the initial attacks started later in 1956. 
However, the IRA’s prospects for success in the border war ‘melted away’ by 1957 as the 
(by then) Irish Republic’s government introduced internment. By the end of 1958, nearly 
all the Army Council, GHQ staff and Sinn Féin executive had been jailed (Smith, 1997: 
71). Inevitably this diminished the IRA’s capacity for waging attacks, though there were 
over five hundred incidents 1956-62 (English, 2003, p.76). The IRA had to call off its 
campaign by February 1962 (English, 2003, p.75). A lack of widespread public support, 
poor organization, successful co-operation between the Gardai (the Republic’s police 
force) and the RUC in Northern Ireland, and the effective use of internment in both 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic all explain the failure of the IRA border 
campaign (English, 2003: 76).  Again, ruthless counterterrorism based on intelligence and 
military suppression proved to be decisive in containing terrorism. 
The failure of the border campaign provoked an internal review led by Cathal 
Goulding, the IRA Chief of Staff from 1962. The response within the IRA was tension 
between those advocating a socialist-republican analysis and those favoring a more 
militant traditionalist approach. Initially, and again as in the 1930s, a leftist group came 
to dominate the IRA; history repeated itself and tensions soon resurfaced between those 
who were more committed to paramilitarism and those more committed to revolutionary 
politics. When Goulding came to power, he inherited an IRA that lacked arms, money or 
volunteers (English, 2003: 83), which, even by the spring of 1969, was still weak as well 
as increasingly divided; British Intelligence estimated that it had just 500 members. 
Although morale was good, arms and ammunition were in short supply and financially 
17 
 
the IRA was weak (Hanley and Millar, 2009: 114). The IRA had not split as a result of 
the border war, but the organization was altered by the experience: membership had been 
lost but a hardcore residual remained within the IRA disillusioned by the political 
direction of its leadership. By the end of the 1960s, the tensions between the 
traditionalists and the radical leftists would come to a head. 
 By the late 1950s, leniency programs toward the IRA had emerged.  In both 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, IRA prisoners were often given early release.  In 
December 1958 two prisoners in Northern Ireland, who had split from the IRA over the 
Roman Catholic Church hierarchy’s condemnation of republican violence, were released. 
By April 1961 the Northern Irish government had released all its internees. Of the 256 
IRA prisoners interned in Northern Ireland eighty-nine ‘signed out’ pledging themselves 
to renounce violence in return for their freedom (Bishop and Maillie, 1987: 31), which 
indicated remarkable faith being placed in promises. Moreover, as the level of the 
violence declined, de Valera’s government in the Republic of Ireland began to show 
leniency towards internees imprisoned at the Curragh jail. In November 1958, twenty-
five were released unconditionally (Flynn, 2009: 172).  Furthermore, in February 1959, 
five more IRA internees were released. De Valera’s willingness to release internees may 
have resulted from his campaign for the Irish Presidency in 1959. In terms of the model 
in Dnes and Garoupa (2010), these releases would have a similar effect to rewarding 
defectors for acts of betrayal: they imply, for the new recruit, an easier time in returning 
to mainstream society after a period of involvement with terrorism.   
Flynn (2009: 204) argues that the roots of the modern factions within the broader 
IRA movement can be traced back to the failure of the 1956-62 border campaign.  At the 
end of the Irish civil war in 1923, following independence from the United Kingdom, 
when de Valera ordered the IRA to bury its weapons, the failure fully to decommission 
weaponry signaled that violence could easily return. At the end of the 1956-62 border 
campaign, Ruairi O Bradaigh’s last order as IRA chief of staff was to “dump arms” 
(Maloney, 2002: 492). In other words, whatever became of the IRA’s financial and 
human capital after 1962, the little physical capital that remained was to be preserved. It 
was in part the historical precedent of 1923 and 1962 that made pro-Agreement Unionists 
so keen to ensure that weapons decommissioning occurred in the wake of the 1998 Good 
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Friday Agreement. Decommissioning in the Irish context can be understood in economic 
terms is a kind of credible commitment device, aimed precisely at preventing the 
continued operation of a hardcore residual that had already been seen at several points in 
history. 
The leniency shown toward prisoners in the late 1950s and early 1960s operated 
to put terrorists back into circulation in the case of unconditional releases.  In the case of 
conditional releases, recirculation could occur if terms of release were flouted, but, at any 
rate, release would signal ‘life after terrorism’ to newer recruits. The IRA was positioned 
to become stronger again as the 1960s progressed. 
   
The Official and Provisional IRA split 1969-70 
A well-known rift within Irish republicanism was sparked by the IRA leadership’s 1969 
decision to end abstention from election to parliaments in Belfast, Dublin and London. 
This decision represented a softening of outlook and a break from republican orthodoxy.  
It was a final straw for traditionalists like Seán MacStíofáin who formed a new body, the 
Provisional Army Council, following the Sinn Féin general meeting known as the Ard 
Fheis held on 11 January 1970 (English, 2003: 106). The resolution to end the policy of 
abstention was pushed through and about one-third of the delegates walked out and 
reassembled to announce the formation of Provisional Sinn Féin (PSF). They also 
announced that a Provisional Army Council had been established to recognize this new 
IRA faction (English, 2003: 107).  
Alonso’s analysis based on a series of interviews suggests that the IRA split in the 
late 1960s was the consequence of tactical more than ideological differences. The 
evidence he presents indicates that different assessments of the value of pursuing the 
bullet and ballot box were instrumental in leading to the split: 
 
...the split at the end of the 1960s between the Officials and Provisionals was due to the latter’s refusal to 
complement the campaign of violence with a greater involvement in politics. From the second half of the 
1970s onwards, however, the Provisionals gradually came to accept the ideas which they had rejected when 
they broke away from the Officials (Alonso, 2007: 142) 
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There were now two separate groups claiming to be the Irish Republican Army- one a 
more leftist grouping led by Goulding, referred to as the Official IRA (OIRA), and the 
other a more traditional and militant republican grouping led by MacStíofáin –the 
Provisional IRA (PIRA) (Smith, 1997: 83; Hanley and Miller, 2009: 146-147). 
Intelligence sources at the US Embassy in Dublin concluded that ‘most of those 
associated with the Republican Movement since 1962 remained with the 
“Officials”…who [have]  retained most of the Movement’s brains, trained men, money 
and arms as well as much of the movement’s Dublin and Cork bases’ (Hanley and Miller, 
2009: 151). Support for the two IRAs was “patchwork” within Belfast (Hanley and 
Miller, 2009: 152-154) 
The Provisional IRA, by relying initially on the pursuit of political objectives by 
exclusively violent means, was a more violent organization than the Official IRA it 
eclipsed. Smith (1977) argues those who joined PIRA in the split from OIRA were in turn 
a coalition of three factions who differed in their willingness to engage in violence. First, 
there were residual veterans of the 1956-62 campaign.  Secondly, the biggest group of 
hardliners comprised northern republicans.  Thirdly there were those like Gerry Adams 
who, although hailing from the north, saw little prospect for reforming Northern Ireland 
(Smith, 1997: 84-86). This third (and most hard-line faction) was ‘undoubtedly the 
smallest and least important faction at the time of the split, but being highly motivated 
politically they were to move swiftly through the Provisionals’ ranks [occupying] 
positions of influence in the years ahead’ (Smith, 1997: 86).  The conditions enabling the 
Provisionals to develop in this manner included the easing back on tough criminal justice 
measures, such as those seen in the 1940s, and leniency/amnesty measures in the 1950s 
and 1960s.   
The motivation of individual Provisional IRA members has been well covered by 
both investigative journalists and academics (O’Doherty, 1998; O’Leary, 2007; English, 
2016). While a complete assessment is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is the case 
that the evidence presents a number of findings particularly relevant to economists. 
Following Frey’s distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation we can see 
evidence of both. English noted that membership of the IRA was not without its extrinsic 
rewards. He highlighted that it could give members celebrity status within some 
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communities (English, 2016: 143). English also noted that some members exploited this 
celebrity status to secure financial and sexual rewards for themselves. Furthermore, 
English saw excitement as a motivation for some members (English, 2016: 143). 
However, English notes that the dominant motivations were often intrinsic. English 
highlights the role of sectarian impulses as an intrinsic motivation and he argues that 
Marxist ideology was a secondary motivation (English, 2016: 108-109). 
The formation of PIRA was caused by disillusionment among hardliners that an 
excessive focus on Marxism and seeking electoral success would diminish what they saw 
as the IRA’s primary function: its military role.  
‘The politics of the old IRA had led to the generation of a new one; the latter owed the 
conditions of its birth, as well as the experience of some its key personnel, to the former.’ 
(English, 2003: 108) 
The Provisional’s greater willingness to engage in tit-for-tat violence and the OIRA’s 
initial reluctance accounts for the separate paths followed. When OIRA did attempt to 
stem the hemorrhaging of its support to PIRA and engaged in more high-profile acts of 
violence, such as the Aldershot bombing of 1972 and the murder in 1971 of the Unionist 
politician Senator Jack Barnhill, it was too late. The OIRA could never out-militarize 
PIRA in the competition for support. By May 1972, OIRA had announced a ceasefire, but 
this announcement was made after widespread internal dissent and the ceasefire was not 
immediately implemented. By the end of 1973 the OIRA ceased military operations 
(Smith, 1997: 90).  
In terms of the support for the Provisional IRA, evidence suggests that it was 
more complex than is often supposed.  For example, location mattered, O’Doherty has 
noted that patterns of support even within West Belfast differed. Support for PIRA in the 
New Lodge was far more related to sectarian tensions than those on the solidly Catholic 
Falls (O’Doherty, 1998: 133). English additionally observes that those discussing IRA 
support should note that Sinn Féin became the electorally dominant party within Irish 
nationalism after the Provisionals started to bring violence to an end (English, 2016: 
119). Scholars have long pointed out that the Provisional IRA faced considerable 
opposition even from communities where it received support, and this had repercussions 
for the organization (Burton, 1978). Even when observers have noted the role of 
punishment beatings and shootings in maintaining popular support they have noted that 
21 
 
the situation was a complex one (Smith, 1997; O’Doherty, 1998). Indeed O’Doherty’s 
insight is that the high level of PIRA violence exerted within working class communities 
was not a measure of any overwhelming support, rather he suggests such violence 
allowed republicans to generate an impression of a coherent republican community in an 
area like West Belfast’ (O’Doherty, 1998: 150).  
Critics of the symbolism of the ceasefire announcement argued that PIRA would 
extend their influence at the expense of the OIRA (Smith, 1997: 89). The winding down 
of OIRA military activities created yet another split. Militants opposed to an OIRA 
ceasefire broke away to form the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) in December 
1974 (Hanley and Miller, 2009: 283). The IRSP had an extremely violent military arm 
known as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). However, the INLA in turn split 
apart in the 1980s as it too was beset by factionalism (Smith, 1997: 90). The growth in 
factionalism may be seen as a process in which milder elements of the IRA were drawn 
back toward mainstream society by a combination of leniency programs and tough 
criminal-justice measures: PIRA and similar subsequent splits were then a hardcore 
response to this process. 
Deterrence as well as leniency programs were both part of the UK response. 
Furthermore, social and interventionist economic policies were developed in response to 
the recognition of a linkage between social deprivation and political violence (Bean, 
2008). In addition, the ability of the UK government in the early 1970s to respond to the 
Provisional IRA’s ‘economic war’ by increasingly subsidizing Northern Irish industrial 
and commercial life arguably acted as a signal to Republicans that violence would not 
cause enough economic damage to attain their objectives (Brownlow, 2012). Roy Mason, 
who served as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland between 1976 and 1979, strongly 
advocated the need to pursue both inward investment and tough security policies within a 
counterterrorism signaling strategy (Brownlow, 2012).        
Another vital component in Northern Irish counterterrorism was the role of 
intelligence. English (2016) observes that more generally the role of intelligence, and the 
use of informers and technical surveillance in particular, was crucial in undermining the 
capacity of PIRA to engage in violence (English, 2016: 125). English suggests that by the 
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late 1980s and early 1990s the intelligence advantage of the state was such that the 
Provisional IRA was made receptive to a compromise deal (English, 2016: 126).  
All other things remaining equal, technical and organizational progress should 
have enabled PIRA to increase their military capacity. The increasing effectiveness of the 
security response from the RUC, British Army and MI5 was to prove vital in forcing the 
Provisional IRA to the negotiating table. Security force infiltration forced organizational 
change on PIRA. PIRA as a response to infiltration shifted away from the old structure of 
brigade/battalion/company towards a cell structure, but the small scale of such a structure 
increased the risk of engaging in attacks. Increased monitoring and infiltration led to an 
increase in counter-ambushes. Between 1978 and 1988, thirty PIRA members were killed 
in Special Air Service (SAS) operations (Smith, 1997: 188). 
 It should equally be recalled that it was a failure of security intelligence that led 
in 1971 to the disastrous reintroduction of internment in Northern Ireland. This botched 
operation made things worse rather than better in that it provided an opportunity in the 
1970s and 1980s for political protest via hunger strikes and similar acts of defiance by 
internees, who could claim to be political prisoners for media purposes: media outlets by 
then being more developed than before.  Nonetheless, at the time, more general 
benevolent policies, coming from Westminster and aimed at encouraging economic 
development and the creation of a political process supportive of peaceful political 
participation, had the gradual impact of encouraging the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin 
eventually to shift away from violence.  
As Figure 1 indicates, violence in Northern Ireland peaked in 1972 and largely 
declined after the mid 1970s.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Contemporary dissidents 
Just as the shift away from political abstention in the late 1960s forced the previous 
dissidents, the more hard line PIRA, to split away from the Official IRA, so similar 
disagreements explain the break away of the various currently active dissident groups. 
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The Provisionals initially announced their ceasefire in 1994 (ended by the 1996 
Canary Wharf bombing in London, but reinstated in 1997). Gradually the electoral 
success of Sinn Féin, and the introduction of power sharing into Northern Irish politics 
led to the final shift from bullets to the ballot box.  Power sharing is actually the 
reservation of a proportion of representative government for what would otherwise be an 
electorally disadvantaged minority, and is a major element in the Good Friday Agreement 
of 1998 that is widely credited with ending conflict in Northern Ireland.  The 
developments in the 1990s and 2000s can be interpreted as the realization by IRA 
factions of gains from their activities as rogue groups, with such gains being unevenly 
distributed (Dnes and Garoupa, 2010: 525).  In particular, the leaderships of factions have 
a strong incentive to participate in peace processes, when gaining high office becomes a 
possibility, which has happened in several cases, including Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuiness.  By September 2005, the Provisional IRA had decommissioned all of its 
weapons, its campaign in 2008 was declared “well and truly over,” and its leadership “no 
longer operational or functional” (Independent International Monitoring Commission, 
2008: 8). The shift from violent to peaceful means took around a decade and a half 
culminating in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 (Moloney, 
2002). The former dissidents had slowly succeeded in finding a way out from terrorism. 
 Peace does not suit all factions. Dissidents see their role as sticking to the true 
path of authentic Irish Republicanism. As one leading member of the 32-County 
Sovereignty Committee has expressed it, 
 
History has shown that when many lost their nerve and threw up their arms in surrender, there were always 
the few and the brave to keep the faith and carry on the torch of republicanism on behalf of our future 
generations (Francie Mackey cited in Frampton, 2010: 40). 
 
 The Continuity IRA (CIRA) along with its political wing - Republican Sinn Féin - owes 
its origins to a split within the Provisional Republican Movement in 1986 when former 
Sinn Féin President and PIRA Army Council Member Ruairi O’Bradaigh refused to back 
the Adams leadership plan to abandon the traditional strategy of abstention (Moloney, 
2002: 289). As with some previous rivals to PIRA, such as OIRA or INLA they lacked 
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enough critical mass in membership to become a serious threat. The CIRA was so fragile 
initially and so fearful of reprisals from the Provisionals that it was some years before the 
CIRA even revealed its existence (Moloney, 2002: 289). 
The CIRA did not become active until after the Provisional IRA ceasefire of 
1994. It has remained active in the period after the Good Friday Agreements and shows 
that even when the terrorist swamp is drained, a hardcore group is likely to remain (Dnes 
and Garoupa, 2010: 526).   This dissident group has been involved in a number of 
bombings, bomb hoaxes, criminal activities, killings of its own members and has claimed 
responsibility for the murder of a police officer in 2009, according to the Independent 
International Monitoring Commission. However, the recurrent tendency towards splits 
reasserted itself and a new faction emerged even from within the Continuity IRA. This 
new group calls itself Óglaigh na hÉireann (Irish Republican Army). Both factions of the 
Continuity IRA include large numbers of ‘ordinary criminals’, who use the cloak of the 
organization to engage in non-terrorist criminality.   
 The Real IRA (and its political wing, the 32-County Sovereignty Committee) was 
formed after yet another split within PIRA. This time the 1997 split was caused by a 
faction within the organization objecting to republicans signing up to the Mitchell 
principles of non-violence, a necessary pre-condition to Sinn Féin entering the all-party 
negotiations which led to the Good Friday Agreement and power sharing (English, 2003: 
316). The new dissident organization also confusingly took the title Óglaigh na hÉireann 
but was soon referred to by the media as ‘the Real IRA’ (Maloney 2002: 479). Such was 
the momentousness of the 1997 decision that it was inevitable that a split would occur. 
The fundamental questions concerned the timing, scale and damage that the split would 
cause.  It is a reflection of discipline within PIRA that it took until 1997 for the split to 
emerge, after two Provisional IRA ceasefires had been called and maintained (Maloney 
2002: 479). The Mitchell principles enabled early prisoner release, after which this 
discipline gave way to yet another split. 
Another modern faction, the Real IRA views itself as the continuation of the 
armed struggle and has adopted Provisional tactics of sustained bombings and shootings 
in both Northern Ireland and on the UK mainland. The Real IRA that was responsible for 
the Omagh bomb which killed 29 people and injured over 200 in 1998. The group called 
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a cease-fire in 1999 but recommenced violence in 2000 (English, 2003: 318). Primarily 
because it includes former members of PIRA with significant technical skills and 
experience, it is regarded currently as the most dangerous of the dissident groups and the 
Independent International Monitoring Commission (2010: 12) concluded that it still 
constitutes the most serious threat to Ireland north and south as well as to the mainland 
UK.  
Despite its generally stark assessment, the Independent International Monitoring 
Commission (2010: 5) does not view the Real IRA’s campaign as comparable to the 
earlier PIRA campaign.  In the Commission’s optimistic view the PIRA lacks the 
personnel, money, organization and cohesion to match PIRA’s former activities. The 
pessimist might observe that a similar assessment could have been made of PIRA’s 
capabilities in 1970.  It is another example of a “nasty residual,” showing that terrorist 
problems rarely completely disappear. A recent study on the emergence of dissident 
Republican groups suggests that the police reform that has occurred in Northern Ireland, 
whilst having political benefits in terms of securing political agreement on policing, has 
had operational costs as well. This cost is of particular concern because the operational 
capacity of the contemporary dissidents is high, as the leadership of the modern 
dissidents, unlike the leadership of the Provisional IRA in the early 1970s, has 
accumulated organizational and technical knowledge from decades of terrorism 
(Frampton, 2010: 34).  
 
The lessons from the history of the IRA 
 
This paper has examined Irish Republican paramilitarism by applying the insights 
from a model to the available historical material. The approach followed complements 
the valuable work of social scientists who have used interviews with former 
paramilitaries to establish the emergence, actions and eventual disappearance of the 
Provisional IRA as an effective paramilitary force (Alonso, 2007; English, 2016). An 
emerging literature about dissidents has recently emerged which follows similar 
approaches as well as discourse and data analyses (Edwards, 2011; Whiting, 2012; 
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Morrison and Horgan, 2016).  Likewise, the insights of these scholars are also 
acknowledged.   
Several important lessons arise from examining the history of IRA activity.  First, 
events reveal the periodic emergence of gaps in human-capital characteristics between 
IRA leaders, terrorist foot soldiers and the wider population. However, the gaps are more 
like a dotted line than the bipolar dichotomy envisaged by Dnes and Garoupa (2010).  
The gap is indeed consistent with the model of human capital formation in gangs, but is 
characterized by much more detail than an insider-outsider view would suggest.  In 
reality, at least in the case of the IRA, we have seen associations between several groups 
of distinct terrorist types, albeit that this gradation ultimately preserves a distinct gap 
between normal society and the terrorists. 
Amnesties and, more generally, leniency programs, have operated to alter the 
incentives for remaining inside IRA groups.  Outside incentives operated through 
amnesties that were typically offered to incarcerated terrorists, but which had 
implications for lowering the cost of getting out of active terrorism for individual IRA 
members. In particular, the Good Friday agreement provided a mechanism allowing 
members of the Provisional IRA to rejoin mainstream politics and realize gains from 
terror campaigns.  
 Factions and terrorist actions continue to exist, after the conclusion of the peace 
process, illustrating the theoretical prediction in Dnes and Garoupa (2010) that nasty 
residuals remain after amnesty arrangements are put into place. It is indeed a rarity to find 
the terrorist swamp completely drained.   
An implication is that authorities using amnesties to draw terrorists back into 
mainstream society should be realistic about what will happen: the terrorist problem will 
not completely disappear. A general observation is that where amnesties have been 
associated with enforced requirements for terrorists to disarm and to do so credibly, any 
residual faction has been weakened in resuming effective terrorism: a very clear practical 
illustration of the importance of devices supporting credible commitments (Williamson, 
1983). The case of Northern Ireland shows the learning of that lesson early on, and then 
its repeated application to the peace process.      
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The pattern of factionalism is consistent with Dnes and Garoupa’s (2010: 523) 
modeling of betrayal possibilities in gangs, but it shows up in practical terms as pressure 
building within a terrorist organization as outside opportunities lead different groups in 
different directions. A connection may be made between an organization’s splitting and 
some of its members being in a position to betray others, or feeling betrayed by others 
who are seen as losing connection with the terrorist cause, so that a split typically 
amounts to the emergence of a hardcore residual faction. Betrayal also reflects a 
breakdown in the leadership’s ability to provide solidarity, which has public-good 
characteristics within the group (compare Skarbek, 2014).  The long tradition of splits 
within Irish republican terrorist groups often reflected left-leaning leaderships falling out 
of step with the wider population, including IRA foot soldiers. This division created 
tensions and led to departures resulting in a hardcore residual that pursued bombing 
campaigns in Ireland and England, reflecting some of the intra-organizational 
commitment issues associated with other rogue groups such as pirates (Leeson, 2009).  
After WWII, the IRA border campaign of 1956-62 was a total failure and subsequent 
amnesties for political prisoners north and south of the Irish border may have facilitated 
later violence.   Conversely, deterrence policies (notably internment, which incapacitates 
terrorists) were successful in most periods in combating the IRA.  Really hard crack 
downs, on both sides of the Irish border, as happened between the late 1930s and early 
1940s, appear to have controlled IRA violence for significant periods of time as a kind of 
“corner solution” in the extreme conditions surrounding WWII. Dnes and Garoupa 
(2010) emphasized the sophisticated manner in which incentives operated within gangs: 
but really harsh, crude imprisonment measures, almost alone, did in fact control the IRA 
in the 1940s. A key ingredient in containment was cross-border cooperation ensuring that 
the terrorists had nowhere to go, at least for a period of time. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
It is important to recognize the many influences on how individuals end up in terrorist 
organizations, which have distinct human-capital characteristics compared with 
mainstream society.  Nonetheless, it is possible to show that terrorist groups form, and 
fragment, under incentives derived from the costs and benefits of joining the 
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organization, including the leader’s problem of maintaining group solidarity.  Tough 
criminal justice policy measures and leniency programs have both played roles in 
containing IRA terrorism since the 1930s. The peace accords following the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998 most certainly allowed a way out from terrorism for IRA members, 
and particularly members of the Provisional IRA, effectively realizing gains from 
terrorism for many individuals.  The history shows that leniency has placed terrorists 
back into circulation and revitalized IRA factions, and that this may have been the real 
effect to worry about in relation to amnesties:  the possibility that reassuring new recruits 
of an eventual way back to mainstream society increased terrorist recruitment was 
worrying, but was dominated by the sheer impact of releasing active terrorists.  In the 
case of IRA violence, imprisoning militants did knock out the organization for lengthy 
periods of time.   
We also examined the prediction that increasing the benefits of moving into 
mainstream society will tend to reduce membership of a terrorist group, but can also 
induce changes in recruitment leading to remaining gang members being particularly 
nasty examples of the genus. The increase in severity predicted to follow from increasing 
outside benefits implies a need for tough action later on, if the group is really to be 
suppressed. Such a hardcore residual membership does seem to be associated with 
prisoner amnesties and organizational splits in the case of the IRA, and still bedevils the 
aftermath of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The analysis developed in this paper 
hence confirms the analysis of political historians and strategic studies scholars that while 
particular terrorist campaigns end, terrorism does not (English, 2009; Edwards, 2011).     
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Figure 1. Deaths and injuries (numbers) associated with the security situation in 
Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland and Great Britain, 1969-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  
Deaths (NI) - PSNI (http://www.psni.police.uk/5._08_09_security_situation.pdf) 
Injuries (NI) - PSNI (http://www.psni.police.uk/persons_injured_cy.pdf) 
Deaths (ROI and GB) – author’s calculations from data supplied by ICR 
Note the various forms of these figures and different measurements offered by different 
sources (see text for details). Some of the previous data offered by the RUC/PSNI have 
been provisional and altered later.  
Source: Data provided by Professor Peter Shirlow, School of Law, Queen’s University 
Belfast. 
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